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Abstract
In this paper we present a new application of game theory, in which game theoretic techniques are
used to provide a rigorous underpinning to the analysis of ad-hoc routing protocols. The explosion
of interest in ad-hoc networks over the last few years has resulted in a very large number of routing
protocols being proposed. Despite this, the science of analysing routing protocols is still relatively
immature, and the question that remains is how to decide “how good” a given protocol is. We
propose a game theoretic approach as a potentially eﬀective means of answering this question. The
conceptual mapping of routing into a game is, we believe, natural and simple. Furthermore, game
theory provides an extensive repertoire of tools to analyse key properties. The paper describes how
routing techniques can be modelled as games and presents some analytical results.
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1 Introduction
Game theory comprises a powerful set of techniques to reason about situations
involving conﬂict and competition. The subject of this paper is the applica-
tion of game theoretic techniques to the analysis of ad-hoc routing protocols.
We believe this to be a novel use of such techniques. The particular way in
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However, we begin with an overview of the current state of research into the
development and analysis of ad-hoc routing protocols.
Over the last few years there has been an explosion of interest in ad-hoc
networking research [1]. A good portion of this research has aimed to develop
routing protocols for ad-hoc networks. The result is that there are now very
many ad-hoc routing protocols. Part of the motivation for designing new
protocols comes from wanting to meet the challenging requirements of the ad-
hoc networking domain; some of these challenges are discussed below. Clearly,
designers of new protocols, or developers of ad-hoc networks, need to analyse
protocols to determine how well requirements are met.
The primary analytical technique is based on simulation, a number of sim-
ulation tools are in use such as OPNET Modeller [2], NS-2 [3] and GloMoSim
[4]. However, these tools do not appear to provide consistent results [5]. Fur-
thermore, [6] and [7] ﬁnd a discrepancy between the results of simulation and
ﬁeld trials deploying actual ad-hoc networks. The question may be asked:
why does simulation give inconsistent and unreliable results? Two answers
come to mind:
• A simulator attempts to represent reality, and its predictions fail because
its representation of reality is not suﬃciently faithful.
• When a model’s behaviours are sampled and analysed by the simulator,
the sample chosen is too small and not suﬃciently representative of the
behaviour of the protocol. In this regard note that the work on mobility
models has the eﬀect of determining, up front, a subspace of the full sample
space [8].
When the cited papers speculate on the reasons for the various poor simulation
results that they ﬁnd, their reasons fall in either (or both) of the categories
above.
Clearly, if the model is perfectly faithful and the sample covers the full
space of the model’s behaviour, then the results of the analysis will be both
consistent and correct. The requirement of perfect ﬁdelity is, of course, im-
possible, while that of full coverage is at best very diﬃcult, even for models
that are very abstract and restricted in the size of the network model. Nev-
ertheless, these two principles, namely ﬁdelity and coverage provide the basis
and the inspiration for our work, which attempts to take a fresh look at the
problem of analysing ad-hoc routing protocols.
1.1 Our Approach and This Paper
In our approach we aim to start with abstract models which we analyse rig-
orously, and then to use the results of these analyses as the basis for a guided
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heuristic search over more accurate models. In eﬀect we intend to combine
the beneﬁts of high coverage (on low ﬁdelity models) with high ﬁdelity models
(analysed with limited coverage).
This paper concerns the ﬁrst step in this programme: how we are analysing
low ﬁdelity models rigorously. Section 2 discusses the level of abstraction
at which we model routing protocols. That section also discusses the ﬁrst
approach that comes to mind for high coverage analysis of the protocol, namely
model-checking, and why we chose not to use model-checking. We believe
that game theory provides an approach to analysing routing protocols that is
both natural and powerful. In Section 3 we give a very brief description of
game theory and how it can be used to analyse routing protocols. Section 4
highlights some generic issues that arise when mapping routing protocols to
games. The results we have achieved to date with game theory are presented in
Sections 5, 6 and 7. This is still an early phase of our proposed programme and
there are various limitations to our current game theoretic analysis technique;
we conclude in Section 8 with a discussion of what these limitations are, how
they may be addressed and the way ahead.
2 Rigorous analysis of routing techniques
2.1 Routing Techniques
Recent research has lead not only to many routing protocols, but to many
routing techniques. By a routing technique we mean the basic strategy that a
routing protocol uses to store and propagate routing information. A routing
technique captures the following three protocol characteristics:
• whether routing information is propagated on demand or proactively;
• whether routing information is propagated by ﬂooding or by propagation
on a spanning tree; and
• the format of the routing information stored locally and communicated
(whether it is link state data, distance vectors, or whatever).
Thus examples of routing techniques might be: proactive ﬂooded distance
vector, proactive multicast link state routing, reactive ﬂooded link reversal,
and so forth.
Routing techniques can be regarded as abstractions of speciﬁc routing pro-
tocols; clearly there are several protocols for each technique. Furthermore, it
is possible to model just the routing technique, rather than a protocol instance
of a technique (we discuss this in Section 3). In our opinion the most abstract
level at which a routing protocol can usefully be modelled is that of the routing
technique it instantiates.
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Having ﬁxed on routing techniques as the level at which we want to begin
our investigation, the obvious questions are: what do we want to learn about
the techniques? And, what analytical tools do we intend to use?
2.2 What Do We Want to Learn?
We can divide routing protocol properties into two sorts:
(i) Soundness. This means that routers make correct routing decisions –
but this property is insensitive to the delay involved, or the resources
consumed, in order to make that decision. Soundness amounts to saying
that the protocol is guaranteed to terminate, eventually and after an
unspeciﬁed amount of communication, with the routers having the correct
view of the network topology.
(ii) Performance. These are also known as eﬃciency requirements. We will
concentrate on the following:
• convergence, which is a measure of how quickly a routing protocol re-
sponds to changes in the network topology,
• network overheads, which is a measure of the network resources that a
routing protocol consumes, simply to enable it to make correct routing
decisions.
The subject of soundness is of interest to routing protocol designers (the
ARPANET bug [9] makes soundness impossible to ignore!), but most of the
eﬀort, on the part of engineers and ad-hoc protocol researchers, goes into
achieving and improving performance. Hence both convergence and network
overheads are well known, and standard texts that cover routing (such as [9])
discuss them in detail. However, we have not found in the literature a clear
analysis of how the various routing techniques compare with respect to these
two performance characteristics. A key objective of our work, the ﬁrst stage
of which is reported in this paper, is to understand this issue.
We can study both the soundness and the performance of routing tech-
niques, and we believe that this makes a good starting point for our programme
of providing a rigorous underpinning to the study of routing protocols. In fact
we hope that rigorous analysis of the performance of routing techniques will
provide a ﬁrm basis for understanding important questions, such as:
(i) What is the impact on convergence of propagating routing information
on a spanning tree, as opposed to ﬂooding the routing information?
(ii) How much reduction is there to the network overheads as a result of using
spanning tree methods?
(iii) Do reactive routing approaches consume less network resources than
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proactive ones?
The received wisdom on the last point is that reactive approaches do reduce
overheads, but we have heard this belief questioned, and we are not aware
of an exact basis for this belief. Having ﬁxed what we want to learn about
routing techniques, the next decision to make is what tools to use.
2.3 What Tools Can We Use?
We are aiming for high coverage in our exploration of the behaviours of a model
of a routing technique. Over the last ten years, the use of model-checking
[10,11] has increased substantially, essentially as a branch of formal methods,
based on the results it has been able to deliver from its exhaustive analysis
of models. The primary use of model-checking is to verify that a design is
correct by creating a model of that design and then checking the complete
behaviour of the model against a speciﬁed property. Model-checkers mainly
verify safety and liveness properties [12] of which the soundness properties of
routing are an instance. However, there are model-checking tools that analyse
models with timing and probabilistic behaviour [13]; could these be used to
study performance of routing techniques?
We believe it is unlikely that probabilistic model-checkers will provide an
eﬀective technology for analysing routing protocol performance; rough calcu-
lations on the size of the space of behaviours (usually called the state space)
that the model-checking tool must check shows why. In a model of 5 nodes,
with each node a router, there are 10 links, under the simplifying assump-
tion that all links are bi-directional. To model the technique of proactive link
state unicast, each router will need to retain at least one piece of information
for each link, viz. whether it is up or down. This means that each router
in the model has at least 210 states (two states for each of 10 links), so a 5
node model has at least (210)5 or 250 states. This simple calculation assumes
that the routers are able to learn about, or become confused about, network
topology independently of each other. 4
A model of 250 states is already intractable for analysis by typical comput-
ing engines, but that is not the end of the story. Such a model would only be
able to study soundness, since it only has binary information about whether
links are up or down. To study performance we need to do two things:
(i) Add information about time, communication delays, rate of change of
the topology, link quality, etc.
4 In reality, there may be some correlation between the states of diﬀerent routers, but on
the other hand 5 nodes is not many!
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(ii) Change the tool from a safety-liveness veriﬁer to a time and probablity
model-checker.
Both these changes are likely to increase the state space dramatically. A typ-
ical response to this sort of problem, from the formal veriﬁcation community,
is that abstraction techniques need to be used. The use of abstraction to make
intractable safety-liveness veriﬁcation problems tractable is interesting, useful
and well-established. However, the use of analogous techniques, in the domain
of performance analysis with model-checkers contains many deeper and harder
problems.
For the reasons given above, we are skeptical that model-checking has the
capability to meet our needs. Nevertheless, it may be that models of 4 routers
can be analysed by model-checkers for performance properties, and that such
analysis can be used to validate the approach that we have chosen, which we
present next.
3 Modeling a routing protocol as a game
Game theory [14] was invented to provide a mathematical foundation for rea-
soning about conﬂict and competition. It has grown into a rich theory, with
powerful mathematical and computational tools. It also has the advantage
of retaining its intuitive appeal, which is what ﬁrst attracted us to it. Two
insights enabled us to turn this pool of theory and tools into a potentially
powerful analytical capability for analysing routing:
(i) A routing protocol can be modelled as a minimax game between the
network and the routers.
(ii) The minimax value of the game can quantify the performance properties.
To explain how these two insights are the basis for using minimax game theory
to analyse routing, we ﬁrst need a brief summary of the game theory that we
will use – standard texts [15,16] discuss the subject more comprehensively.
3.1 Basic Form of a Minimax Game
In a minimax game each player chooses game moves to maximise his or her
guaranteed minimum gain (hence the term minimax); in simple language,
players attempt to make the bottom line as high as possible.
Suppose we are considering a two-player game in which, at each turn, a
player has a choice of three legal moves. Figure 1 might represent possible
choices for the ﬁrst two moves of such a game; it is a tree in which each
node represents a state of the game and each branch represents a legal move







Fig. 1. A representation of a game
between two states. Such a structure is called a game tree.
A run of the game is a path through the game tree starting at the root node
(which represents the initial state) and ending at a leaf node (at which the
game has ended). Each run of the game therefore corresponds to a particular
sequence of moves chosen by the two players in turn. A cost function is
evaluated at the leaves of the game tree. It maps each complete run of the game
to a value representing the outcome of the game for this run. The outcome is
the cost of this run for a particular player, known as the minimising player.
The game must be zero-sum, meaning that the cost for the other player (the
maximising player) is minus the cost for the minimising player. As their names
suggest, the minimising player tries to minimise the cost function, while the
maximising player tries to maximise it.
When the game tree can be fully explored, the minimax strategy will ﬁnd
a path that guarantees the best outcome for each player when the other plays
as well as possible. 5 For example, consider a game in which each player makes
a single move in turn, each choosing from two possible moves. Figure 2 shows
three stages of a minimax search for such a game. Stage 1 shows the value
of the cost function at each leaf node. Stage 2 shows that in the left-hand,
middle layer state of the game tree Player II (the minimising player) would
choose the move that minimises the outcome; the game would end in the leaf
state with outcome 2. Stage 3 shows Player II’s decision in the right-hand
state, and also that Player I would choose the move leading to the left-hand
state, guaranteeing himself the largest minimal outcome.
3.2 Modelling Routing as a Game
The intuition behind modelling routing as a game is to note that the problem
of routing can be understood as a contest between the network and the routers.
The routers are, in eﬀect, competing with a network that is trying to outwit
5 When it is not feasible to explore the whole game tree, the cost function must sometimes
be applied to truncated runs; in such cases it eﬀectively judges the state of the game using
a heuristic. We discuss this in Section 4.5.
I. Zakiuddin et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 119 (2005) 67–92 73




2 7 8 1
2




Stage 2 Stage 3Stage 1
Fig. 2. The minimax algorithm at work
them. How well do the routers perform against “Murphy’s network”? We are
therefore considering a two-player, zero-sum game, as described above. 6 To
model anything as such a game we need to:
• identify the two players and their initial states, saying which is the minimis-
ing player and which is the maximising player;
• deﬁne the game moves for each of the players;
• specify a cost function that quantiﬁes the outcome for the minimising player;
the minimising player chooses moves to minimise this function and the max-
imising player chooses moves to maximise it.
In all our uses of game theory the two players will be same. All the routers
together form one player, which is referred to henceforth as the set-of-routers
player; the other player is the set of links, which is called the network player.
Game moves for the set-of-routers player are, in essence, to execute the routing
protocol. And for the network player game moves are to change the network
topology. This is the basic insight behind our mapping to model routing
protocols as games; the sections below expand on this to describe the mappings
in more detail. The cost function depends on the property being studied, and
is discussed, below, for each property separately.
Once the game has been deﬁned the game tree can be constructed and
explored. The minimax strategy searches through the game tree to ﬁnd the
minimax path; the minimax value (or minimax outcome) is the cost function
applied to this path. The meaning of the minimax value can be interpreted in
the following way: within the constraints provided to the game, if the routers
behave optimally, then whatever changes in the network occur, the routers are
guaranteed to do no worse than the minimax value.
With these basic intuitions described we can think in a bit more detail
about how game theory can be used to study the properties that interest us.
6 This mapping is not unique; it would, for instance, be possible to construct an n-player
game.
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3.3 Targeting Soundness
When analysing the soundness of a routing protocol, the objective is to un-
derstand whether the routing protocol copes with a mobile network, however
much it changes.
To turn this into a game we ﬁrst note that the network can be understood
to have won if the routers are unable to gain a correct view of the network.
In our game theoretic model the game ends when the network has stopped
changing and one of the two players has won. The set-of-routers wins if all
routers have succeeded in gaining a correct view of the network, and the
network wins if the routers are mistaken about the state of the network, and
are unable to rectify this state.
The cost function of the game can be considered to be a cost predicate –
“routers have a correct view of the topology in the ﬁnal state of the game”.
The results we obtain from this analysis are of the following forms:
• the protocol copes if the predicate is eventually true; or
• the protocol does not cope if the predicate remains false, however much
opportunity the routers are given to regain a correct view.
3.4 Targeting Network Overheads
The objective in studying the network overheads consumed by a routing pro-
tocol is to understand how much network traﬃc is required for the routing
protocol to cope with a changing network. Recall from Section 2.2 that we
are principally interested in comparing routing protocols, so the exact mea-
sure we use is less important than having a consistent basis for comparison.
The game ends when the routers have gained a correct view of the network. It
is therefore necessary for the routing protocol to be sound; i.e., routers must
always be able to recover after changes in the network, in the sense described
in the previous section.
The cost function of the game is a measure of the amount of traﬃc required
by the routers to gain a correct view of the network. Unlike investigations of
soundness, network traﬃc on each run of the game must be tracked, so the cost
for a path depends on the complete path to the ﬁnal state. It is then possible
to produce graphs showing the network traﬃc required to gain a correct view,
against degree of network ﬂuctuation. In line with our objective of comparing
routing protocols, the results from this analysis take the form of a comparison
of network traﬃc graphs for diﬀerent routing protocols.
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3.5 Targeting Convergence
When investigating convergence of a routing protocol, the objective is to un-
derstand how quickly the routers’ beliefs converge to correct (or suﬃciently
correct) views of the network. In this case, the game can continue indeﬁ-
nitely. In practice, the game is run for as long as is required for us to gain a
satisfactory idea of the behaviour of the protocol.
The cost function of the game is dominated by the correctness of the
routers’ views of the network; the more correct the routers are, the better the
routers have done. The cost function also includes a measure of the network
traﬃc, which is used to choose between moves that lead to states with the
same degree of correctness of the routers’ views; the higher the network traﬃc
is, the worse the routers have done. The network traﬃc part of the cost
function depends on the complete path to the ﬁnal state, and the (dominant)
correctness part depends on only the ﬁnal state.
We need some way of measuring the correctness of the routers’ views of
the network, and how this changes with time. We have a correctness measure
which measures correctness for the purpose of assessing convergence. This
correctness measure is calculated as an average over all routers. Graphs can
be produced showing (average) degree of correctness at each state along the
minimax path, against time. Again our main concern is to compare routing
protocols, so the results from this analysis are a comparison of convergence
graphs for diﬀerent routing protocols.
4 Generic mapping issues
4.1 Overview of Mapping
The previous section outlined how games might be constructed to analyse
various properties of routing protocols. In this section we look at the generic
issues in deﬁning the mapping, prior to a more detailed discussion of the
speciﬁcs of the mapping for each analysis problem.
To study soundness and performance of a routing protocol we deﬁne the
game as follows:
(i) the set-of-routers player, representing the set of all the routers, is the
minimising player; the network player, representing the set of all the
links, is the maximising player; in the initial state of the game all links
are down and each router has a correct view of the network;
(ii) an atomic move for a router is to send all its routing messages, as speciﬁed
by the protocol (in addition, all routers notice local link changes and
process received messages). An atomic move for the network changes the
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state of one link from up to down or vice versa. A game move, for either
player, is a (small) number of atomic moves;
(iii) the cost function is a lexicographic ordering of two measures, in the fol-
lowing order:
(a) the inconsistency, at the ﬁnal state of the path, of the routers’ views
of the network topology with the actual state of the network;
(b) the amount of network traﬃc used by the routers.
So, the network player aims to maximise the cost function, which records how
confused the routers are about the state of the network, and how much traﬃc
they have used; the set-of-routers player aims to minimise this same func-
tion. The lexicographic cost function described here gives the cost functions
described in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 for the three types of analysis; in partic-
ular, the inconsistency part can be ignored when the cost function is evaluated
in a state of the game where the routers have correct views of the network.
We have described the basic mapping we are using, but there are a number
of issues regarding the exact way this mapping is implemented; these are
discussed in the next section.
4.2 Modelling Issues
As we are considering routing techniques rather than speciﬁc routing protocols,
we have begun by analysing low ﬁdelity models of real protocols. As a result
we have been forced to make a number of modelling decisions regarding the
mapping of routing protocols to a minimax game. We describe the most
important issues here. In some cases the same decision has been taken in each
of our analyses, and in some cases we have found it necessary to make diﬀerent
decisions according to the kind of analysis being performed.
Below we discuss the following modelling issues in some detail:
• The criteria used to decide what updates to send out.
• The representation of update data.
• Details of the distance vector routing model.
• How to deal with the optimal scheduling assumption.
• The exact form of the game’s cost function.
One of the most signiﬁcant decisions we have had to make involves the criteria
a router uses to choose what updates to send out, when it is scheduled. The
question is whether to model routers creating and sending out updates only
in response to changes in the network, or if they should send out updates
regardless of whether the network has changed (we call these two options
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“output on change” and “output always” respectively). In a real routing
protocol, there would most likely be a combination of the two, with updates
created and sent in response to a change in the state of the network, as well
as periodic broadcasting of updates. However, at this stage we have decided
to use either one approach or the other, for simplicity of modelling. The
particular decision made is explained in each analysis section.
Another modelling decision we have made relates to the representation of
the data contained in updates. We have to choose between representing up-
dates accurately as either link state packets (LSPs) or distance vectors, 7 and
representing
them less accurately as individual link state updates or distances. There
are computational eﬃciency reasons for using individual link state updates or
distances, but it would clearly be preferable to use a more accurate represen-
tation. We explain later which option we chose in each of our analyses.
We had to make a decision relating to our distance vector routing model,
which was whether distance vectors being transmitted by routers should in-
clude the entire path to a node or simply the neighbour on that route. Again
diﬀerent choices were made in diﬀerent analyses; these are explained in the
appropriate sections.
A further issue we had to address was how to model the scheduling of
routers. All the routers together form the set-of-routers player, who decides
which router should send routing updates in each atomic move. In eﬀect we
are assuming that the routers are under the control of a global controller that
can enforce optimal scheduling. We use fairness constraints to deal with this
unrealistic optimal scheduling assumption. A fairness constraint imposes a
restriction on which routers are permitted to perform atomic moves at any
given point in the game. When we say that we are using an n + k fairness
constraint, this means that each of the n routers must perform a set-of-routers
atomic move at least once in every n + k set-of-routers atomic moves. (We
also refer to this by saying that each router must be scheduled at least once
in every n + k set-of-routers atomic moves.) We indicate in the appropriate
sections where fairness constraints are being used.
Another issue is exactly what should constitute the game’s cost function.
The network traﬃc part of the function has been used consistently throughout
our analyses, to represent the number of pieces of routing information sent.
However, we discovered it was necessary to vary the inconsistency part of
the cost function, according to the kind of analysis we were carrying out.
Depending upon how diﬃcult we wanted to make the routers’ task of gaining
7 Brieﬂy, a link state packet records the states of all other nodes in the network; a distance
vector records the distances to all other nodes in the network.
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a correct view of the network, we varied the form of the inconsistency part of
the function, to be somewhere between knowledge of a single link or distance,
and knowledge of the entire network; the choices made are explained in each
analysis section.
4.3 Detailed Description of a Set-of-Routers Atomic Move
The atomic moves and game moves for the network are (we hope) reason-
ably clear. The game moves for the set-of-routers are rather more complex,
so we elaborate on them here in some detail. This section is not vital for
understanding the approach, so the reader may choose to skip to Section 4.4.
In each atomic move one router is chosen (the choice being determined by
the need to minimise the cost function that records inconsistency and network
traﬃc). Let us say that router n is chosen, then the atomic move consists of
the following sequence of activities: 8
(i) Each router checks the state of its local links, and updates its own record
of the state of those links accordingly. 9
(ii) Each router performs some processing, as follows:
(a) In link state routing, every router creates its own LSP and puts it on
its outgoing queue (as is required by the “output always” model).
(b) In distance vector routing, each router discards distance vectors it
had received from neighbours for which the link has just gone down,
and recalculates its own distance vector accordingly.
(iii) Router n performs a broadcast, which consists of the following:
(a) In link state routing, router n processes the LSPs on its holding queue
(which is empty the ﬁrst time this router is scheduled). For each one,
if router n is now linked to the LSP’s destination router, that LSP is
removed from the holding queue and added to a list of LSPs that are
to be broadcast.
Router n then processes the LSPs on its outgoing queue (which
contains only router n’s own LSP the ﬁrst time this router is sched-
uled). Each LSP in the outgoing queue is cloned a number of times,
with each clone corresponding to a particular destination router other
than n itself and the sender of the LSP (if diﬀerent from n). For each
8 Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that we have chosen to represent updates as
link state packets or distance vectors, and that we are using the “output always” approach.
9 Note that in both link state routing and distance vector routing, all routers maintain a
record of at least the state of their local links; in link state routing routers also maintain a
view of the rest of the network, while in distance vector routing routers also maintain their
own distance vector.
I. Zakiuddin et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 119 (2005) 67–92 79
cloned LSP, if n is linked to the destination of that LSP, the LSP is
added to the list of LSPs to be broadcast, overwriting any duplicate
LSPs already there. If n is not linked to the destination of the LSP,
the LSP is added to n’s holding queue, as long as its timestamp is
more recent than that of any LSP already in the holding queue, orig-
inating from the same source and with the same destination. Each
LSP in the list to be broadcast is then delivered to its destination.
(b) In distance vector routing, router n broadcasts its own distance vector
to all neighbours to which it is linked (as required by the “output
always” model).
(iv) All routers that have been sent updates receive them, and act as follows:
(a) In link state routing, when a router receives an LSP it updates its
view of the network accordingly. It then puts the LSP on its outgoing
queue, but only if its timestamp is more recent than that of any LSP
already in the outgoing queue, originating from the same source and
with the same destination. (In reverse-path forwarding, the router
does none of this unless it believes the sender of the LSP is on the
shortest path between itself and the source of the LSP.)
(b) In distance vector routing, when a router receives a distance vector,
it adds this to its list of stored distance vectors, replacing any dis-
tance vector previously received from the same neighbour. It then
recalculates its own distance vector.
It is also possible for a ‘null’ set-of-routers atomic move to occur. In this
case, no router is scheduled, and only activities 1 and 2 in the list above are
performed.
4.4 Implementation
We implemented a simple Java tool that uses the above mappings to model, as
a minimax game, three diﬀerent routing techniques, namely link state routing
[9], the reverse path forwarding (RPF) algorithm [17] for link state routing,
and distance vector routing [9]. The tool allows the user to specify the number
of atomic moves that comprise each game move. It then generates the game
tree for that game, and searches it for the result according to the minimax
algorithm.
Modelling a 7 node network, the tool can build and fully search a game tree
consisting of 12 atomic moves in a few minutes. It is diﬃcult to compare this
type of bounded depth ﬁrst search with the full depth ﬁrst (or breadth ﬁrst)
search of a model-checker. However, the approach described here is yielding
a degree of useful analysis on models with state spaces that are far beyond
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the scope of any model-checker. The speed of the search has beneﬁted from
the use of alpha-beta pruning [18] and some simple symmetry reduction, but
we have not put much eﬀort into optimising the search tool; it is a crude and
simple prototype.
4.5 Tractability of Analysis
The size of network that we are able to analyse with this technique is a good
deal larger than would be possible using conventional model-checking tech-
niques. However, the exponential growth of the game tree is a seriously lim-
iting factor on how deep in the tree it is possible to search in a reasonable
period of time.
We have addressed this problem by implementing an additional facility in
our game search tool. This facility allows us to perform recursive runs of a
game, where the initial state of any run (except the ﬁrst) is the ﬁnal state
of the previous run. This is not equivalent to a complete search of the game
tree; rather, it provides an estimate of the state of the game, using a heuristic.
This technique enables us to search arbitrarily deep in the game tree.
5 Analysing soundness
The ﬁrst routing protocol characteristic we analysed was soundness. A routing
protocol is certainly not sound if the routers can be ‘beaten’ by the network.
However, the converse does not hold. A failure of the network to win does not
constitute a veriﬁcation of the protocol, even merely for the size of network
modelled; this contrasts with model-checking.
To see this, remember that the set-of-routers player acts as a global con-
troller, deciding which router should send routing updates in each atomic move
– this is the optimal scheduling assumption mentioned earlier. An important
consequence of this assumption is that our technique is currently a refutation
procedure: if the set-of-routers can force a win then the routing protocol may
still be ﬂawed, since a non-optimal scheduling order might cause the routers
to fail; on the other hand, if our technique ﬁnds that the set-of-routers must
lose (even under the optimal scheduling assumption) then there is a genuine
problem for the routing protocol.
5.1 How We Used the Tool
When we were considering how to use our tool to analyse the soundness of
a routing protocol, the question that had to be asked was: what would ac-
tually constitute a victory for the network, or in other words, how would an
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unsoundness manifest itself in the output of the tool?
The answers lay in the inconsistency part of the cost function. A non-zero
inconsistency value indicates that at least one router has, at that point in the
game, been unable to gain a correct view of the network. It is to be expected
that routers will become confused about the state of the network at times
during the game. However, if a routing protocol is to be considered sound,
one would expect that if, at any time, the network were to be ﬁxed at any
particular state, each router should eventually converge to a correct view of
at least the partition of the network in which it is located.
We observed therefore that if, with routers behaving according to some
speciﬁed routing protocol, it is possible to ﬁnd a state of the game in which at
least one router is unable to regain a correct view of the (no longer changing)
network by the end of the game, then that protocol can be considered unsound.
This is what we consider constitutes a victory for the network. 10
We carried out a number of experiments with two routing protocols, namely
link state RPF and distance vector routing. We provided the tool with var-
ious numbers and combinations of network and set-of-routers atomic moves,
trying to ﬁnd victories for the network, i.e. situations where routers become
irretrievably confused. Our results are detailed below.
5.2 Decisions
The inconsistency part of the cost function is:
• for link state routing, correctness of the believed state of the link between
node 0 and node 1;
• for distance vector routing, correctness of the believed distances to node 0
and to node 1.
The messages take the form of individual updates and distances, rather than
packets and vectors, and we use the “output on change” model. We do not
use fairness constraints.
This information is summarized in Table 1.
5.3 Results
We began by considering the link state RPF algorithm. However, the tool
could not ﬁnd any ﬂaws in this algorithm, so to validate our approach we
tweaked the models so that:
• the algorithm was wrong, or
10 We used a bounded depth search, which is discussed in Section 8.
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• individual routers could behave incorrectly.
In both cases the game search found ways in which the network could beat
the set-of-routers.
We then investigated distance vector routing. It is well known in the
routing community that distance vector routing in its most simple form suﬀers
from the Count to Inﬁnity Problem [9], whereby routers can forward packets
to each other inﬁnitely often because of mistaken local beliefs about the state
of the network. (For example, router A might believe the shortest route to C
is via next hop B, while B believes the best route to C is via A.)
In this case, the tool reported that the network could force a win, so we were
able to conclude that such confusion could eventually arise. Inspection of the
state reached on the path to the minimax solution revealed that counting to
inﬁnity was possible, which we had not expected for the particular initial state
and operating assumptions modelled. Similarly, the tool found an example of
counting to inﬁnity occurring even for the Split Horizon [9] variant of distance
vector routing.
These experiments served to validate our approach; they provided evidence
that the tool is capable of ﬁnding surprising behaviours.
6 Analysing network overheads
We felt that the work on game search to study soundness was in itself novel and
interesting, but our interest in minimax search as a basis for understanding
routing increased greatly when we realised how to use game search to study
network overheads.
6.1 How We Used the Tool
The simple observation is that the minimax value calculated of a game between
the routers and the network can serve as a potentially eﬀective characterisa-
tion of the routing protocol’s performance. Recall that we are using a cost
function that records the number of routing update packets that have been
sent by routers. If we work out how many update packets are required for the
routers to achieve a correct view of the network, then we have a measure of
performance. This cost function treats each routing update packet as having
the same cost, and it assumes a uniform link quality. Even so, it does pro-
vide a basic measure of how much network resource is consumed to support
routing.
Notice that we now need to evaluate the cost function at states of the game
along the whole path, not merely at the ﬁnal state of the path. This distin-
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guishes it from the cost function we used when mapping soundness analysis
to a game.
It is widely believed that RPF consumes lower network overheads than
ﬂooding (indeed inspection of the algorithms indicates that this is likely to
be the case). Nevertheless, we have not been able to ﬁnd in the literature
any analytical quantiﬁcation of the savings achieved by RPF. In line with our
aim of rigorously analysing routing techniques, we have used game theoretic
analysis to quantify the savings achieved by RPF. We have also used these
techniques to investigate the network overheads required by distance vector
routing.
Each game encodes a particular initial state and constraints on the num-
ber of consecutive atomic moves allowed within each player move. Thus all
questions asked of the tool are with respect to a particular initial state and
particular move constraints.
The tool was used to determine how many set-of-routers atomic moves are
needed to cope with the network changes (i.e., to achieve a correct belief at
each connected node about the state of a particular link) for various numbers
of alternating network and set-of-routers moves. The cumulative amount of
routing traﬃc required was measured at regular intervals throughout the game.
6.2 Decisions
The choice of the inconsistency part of the cost function was aﬀected by com-
putational eﬃciency considerations. If all the routers were expected to gain
a correct view of the entire network after every set-of-routers move, then it
would be necessary to search very deep in the tree, which would become com-
putationally intractable. Therefore we set the inconsistency part of the cost
function to the less stringent choice that was used for the soundness analysis;
it is reproduced below:
• for link state routing, correctness of the believed state of the link between
node 0 and node 1;
• for distance vector routing, correctness of the believed distances to node 0
and to node 1.
The messages take the form of individual updates and distances, rather
than packets and vectors, and we use the “output on change” model. We have
produced results both with and without the use of fairness constraints. 11
This information is summarized in Table 1.
11 We also constructed a model using the “output always” approach, and where the messages
were LSPs and distance vectors; however, the results obtained from that model were less
conclusive than those presented here.


















Number of game moves
5 routers, no constraint
flooding
RPF
Fig. 3. Comparison of traﬃc for RPF and ﬂooding
6.3 Results
Figure 3 shows how the total routing traﬃc communicated to regain the correct
network view varies with increasing numbers of moves.
A reduction in network overheads consumed by RPF compared to ﬂooding
is indeed apparent in Figure 3, but we were surprised by the small improvement
shown; we had expected a larger gap between the two graphs. On reﬂection
we formed the opinion that the small gap size was likely to be an artefact
of our mapping to a game; we hypothesised that the blame lay with the
(unrealistic) full control the set-of-routers player has to schedule individual
routers. The intuition is that realistic results are more likely to be exhibited if
some unrealistic power is removed from the set-of-routers player, in this case
the unconstrained power to choose which router to schedule for each atomic
move. (Indeed, it is credible that a set-of-routers player with full control of
when to schedule routers can take better advantage of this power if routers
ﬂood messages than if they use RPF: the set-of-routers player can choose to
schedule them in the same order as they are optimally scheduled when running
RPF, thus minimising the non-RPF communications.)
In reality, of course, routers operate concurrently and often on similar
processors under similar load, so they may be considered to be scheduled at
similar rates. This suggested to us that more realistic results would emerge
if the set-of-routers were constrained to be scheduled in a fair way. So, as
mentioned in Section 4, we opted to formulate fairness constraints that require
each router to be scheduled at least once in any sequence of n + k successive
set-of-routers atomic moves, where n is the number of routers, and k is a
number that characterises the degree of fairness.





















Number of game moves
5 routers, n+2 constraint
flooding
RPF
Fig. 4. Comparison of traﬃc for RPF and ﬂooding with fairness constraint
We tested our hypothesis by extending the tool to allow such fairness
constraints to be enforced. We then generated new pairs of graphs, with
varying degrees of fairness enforced. Figure 4 shows the graphs for the case
where 5 routers must each be scheduled in any sequence of 7 set-of-routers
atomic moves. As hypothesised, the results show a larger reduction in the
network overheads consumed by RPF over ﬂooding than when there are no
fairness constraints.
We concluded our investigation of network overheads by measuring the
overheads consumed by distance vector routing. It is diﬃcult to directly com-
pare results obtained for distance vector routing with our prior results for link
state routing, as the inconsistency parts of the respective cost functions are,
by necessity, diﬀerent. Nevertheless, our results for distance vector routing,
with and without fairness constraints, are displayed in Figure 5.
7 Analysing convergence
Having had some success in our analysis of soundness and network overheads,
our attention then turned to the one remaining routing protocol property
mentioned in Section 2.2, namely convergence.
7.1 How We Used the Tool
It is widely believed that link state routing converges more quickly than dis-
tance vector routing, and that link state ﬂooding converges more quickly than
link state RPF[9]. However, again we have been unable to ﬁnd any analyti-
cal quantiﬁcation of this. We felt that game theory could be usefully applied















Number of game moves
5 routers, distance vector routing
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full link state packet
/
full distance vector
Output model output on change output on change output always
Form of cost func-
tion




link between 0 and 1
/
distances to 0 and 1
link between 0 and 1
/






at ﬁnal state along whole path along whole path
Fairness constraint without with and without with and without
Distance vector
model
not entire path report entire path report entire path
Correctness met-
ric
n/a n/a % links correct /
% neighbours correct
Table 1
Summary of modelling decisions (link state routing / distance vector routing)
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to address these questions, and indeed we have been able to use game theo-
retic techniques to carry out an analytical comparison of the convergence of a
number of diﬀerent routing protocols.
However, it was not immediately obvious how we could use our game search
tool to quantify the convergence of a routing protocol. It was clear that the
network convergence cost function did not provide us with enough informa-
tion to do this, and that we needed our tool to provide us with more detailed
output of the routers’ state throughout the game. We therefore enhanced the
functionality of the tool, so that it calculates how accurately each router views
the network at each time index during the game, according to some correct-
ness metric. The precise metric used varies according to the routing protocol
being analysed, because the information maintained at routers depends on the
particular routing protocol.
In constructing a game to analyse convergence, we decided to use alternate
network and set-of-routers moves, where the number of atomic moves for each
was ﬁxed up-front. The number of set-of-routers atomic moves was carefully
chosen to give the routers reasonable opportunity to recover a “good enough”
view of the network before the network changed state again. In this case we
decided that “good enough” did not mean that all routers had to regain a
completely correct view.
7.2 Decisions
Unlike our analysis of network overheads, here we do not require all routers
to gain a correct view of the network, so the computational eﬃciency of the
search is not an issue. Therefore the following choices were made for the
inconsistency part of the cost function:
• for link state routing, does each router have a completely correct view of
the network?
• for distance vector routing, does each router have a completely correct dis-
tance vector?
The correctness metric is deﬁned as follows:
• for link state routing, the average percentage of links about whose state
routers have a correct belief.
• for distance vector routing, the average proportion of neighbours in the
routers’ distance vectors that are correct.
The messages take the form of LSPs and distance vectors, and we use the
“output always” model. We have produced results both with and without the
use of fairness constraints.

























Fig. 6. Comparison of convergence of distance vector routing, link state RPF and link state ﬂooding
This information is summarized in Table 1.
7.3 Results
Figure 6 shows how the routers’ view of the network varies during a game in
which the network and set-of-routers are alternately given two atomic moves
and four atomic moves respectively. To understand what the graph is showing
us, it is important to realise that the time index is incremented after every
set-of-routers atomic move, so the network changes state between time 4 and
time 5, between time 8 and time 9, and so on.
We see that after a network move routers become confused and then recover
some way towards a correct view of the network; comparing graphs, it can be
seen that the degree of confusion and the rate of recovery are somewhat worse
in distance vector routing than in link state RPF. The same is true, but to
a lesser extent, for link state RPF and link state ﬂooding respectively. It is
diﬃcult to give a precise quantiﬁcation of convergence from Figure 6, but it
is at least possible to gain some idea of the relative speeds of convergence of
the diﬀerent routing protocols.
Figure 6 was obtained without the use of a fairness constraint, which, as has
been observed before, could mean that the set-of-routers player were allowed
unrealistic power to schedule particular routers. To solve this problem we
re-ran the game as before, except that this time we imposed an n+2 fairness
constraint (so that all 5 routers must be scheduled in any sequence of 7 set-
of-routers atomic moves). The results from this are shown in Figure 7.
This graph is broadly similar; the main observation to be made is that there
is a larger gap between link state RPF and link state ﬂooding. We believe

























Fig. 7. Comparison of convergence of distance vector routing, link state RPF and link state ﬂooding
with fairness constraint
this is a more realistic reﬂection of the relative speeds of convergence of the
two protocols. Our analysis has conﬁrmed prior beliefs about convergence of
routing protocols, which we again feel validates the game theoretic approach.
8 Limitations and further work
There are a number of limitations of this approach:
(i) Perfect information. The minimax game is a game of perfect information,
as in chess. In simple terms this means that each player is assumed to
have full knowledge of the state of the game. This is clearly a strong
assumption. Our current research is investigating mapping to games of
imperfect information.
(ii) Optimal scheduling of routers. The assumption that routers are opti-
mally scheduled is certainly a limitation of the approach; it makes it a
refutation procedure. However, we believe this can be addressed within
the current framework by imposing fairness constraints, or considering
games of chance.
(iii) Finite number of nodes. Our ability to model only about 7 or 8 routers
is much better than we would expect with a model-checker, but it is still
a far cry from the thousands of nodes found in a real network. There are
various approaches to this problem, which will be reported in a future
paper.
(iv) Bounded depth. It has been argued that a major limitation of this ap-
proach is that the depth of the game tree is bounded. We may have a
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‘result’ for our bounded depth, but that gives no guarantee against the
possibility of the model exhibiting very diﬀerent behaviour one ply deeper
in the game tree. We plan to address this problem by demonstrating that
the cost function is continuous with respect to the depth bound.
(v) Determinism. Our models have no notion of probabilities associated with
game moves, which is a further limitation. This relates to games of
chance.
(vi) Details of mapping. Several choices arise when deciding how to map a
particular routing technique to a game. There is an obligation to ensure
that these choices are appropriate for the property investigated. More
work is planned to determine the most suitable choices.
Further work will combine a study of these limitations and ways to address
them along with continued modelling of routing techniques and game theoretic
quantiﬁcation of their performance properties.
9 Conclusions
This paper has argued that rigorous analysis of ad-hoc routing protocols can
be achieved by mapping the protocols to simple games and calculating their
minimax outcomes. We have illustrated the approach by analysing key cor-
rectness and performance characteristics of some basic routing techniques.
Our main motivation has been to understand the bounds on performance of
routing protocols. We feel that game theory has all the conceptual tools nec-
essary for the rigorous analysis of ad-hoc routing protocols. In addition, game
theory has the advantage of scaling rather better than might be expected with
model-checkers.
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